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IV 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial court erred in determining that the parties' Real Estate Purchase 
Contract ("REPC") failed due to lack of consideration. Addendum No. 1 required the 
payment of $10,000.00 on or before July 30,2004, to extend the REPC's Settlement 
Deadline from August 1, 2004 to October 1, 2004. These Settlement Deadline 
extension provisions never became operative. Prior to July 30, 2004, the parties 
entered into the Second Addendum to the REPC - Addendum No. III. Addendum 
No. Ill, which was timely signed by all of the parties and was consummated before 
July 30,2004, extended the REPC's settlement deadline to February 1,2005 without 
requiring any payments from the Young Entities.1 Addendum No. Ill provides that 
where its terms conflict with the terms of the REPC or any other Addenda, its terms 
shall govern. Addendum No. Ill's extension terms manifestly conflict with and modify 
the previously existing extension terms of Addendum No. 1. Accordingly, no 
$10,000.00 extension payment was due and the lack of such payment cannot 
invalidate the parties' contract: Addendum No. 1 never became effective. 
As evidenced by the Gurneys' lack of any substantive argument to the 
contrary, the trial court also erred in concluding that the REPC was void ab initio, or 
"lapsed," due to its date of execution. The parties executed the REPC and 
Addendum No. 1 at the exact same time - December 1, 2003 8:30 p.m. 
Accordingly, the Young Entities' offer to the Gurneys came into being at that moment 
and the Gurneys immediately accepted it. 
1
 All of the Appellants will collectively be referred to as the "Young Entities" 
and all of the Appellees will collectively be referred to as the "Gurneys". 
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Under those facts, the offer acceptance deadline of November 28, 2003 is 
meaningless and does not invalidate the contract. Even if the offer acceptance 
deadline was somehow effective despite the fact that the offer embodied in the 
REPC did not come into being until after the deadline's expiration, the Young 
Entities, as offeror, either waived the deadline or the Gurneys' acceptance of the 
REPC represented a counteroffer that was, in turn, accepted by the Young Entities. 
Under either analysis, the parties formed a binding contract. 
Finally, the Gurneys breached their obligations under paragraph 2 of the third 
Addendum to the REPC -Addendum No. 3. Per Addendum No. 3, the Gurneys are 
required to "give full cooperation while working with the city & state entities through 
the entitlement process & water share assignments." The Gurneys failed to "give full 
cooperation" in regard to "water share assignments" by failing and refusing to 
transfer certain well-water rights to the Lehi Metropolitan Water District, preventing 
completion of the "entitlement process" - (they prevented Lehi City from approving 
the Gurney Estates Subdivision). The Gurneys' failures to meet their obligations 
under Addendum No. 3, activated Addendum No. 3's day-to-day extension of the 
REPC's Settlement Deadline. No party argued or presented evidence to support the 
notion that the day-to-day extension of the REPC, per Addendum No. 3, has 
extended beyond a reasonable period of time. 
Accordingly, the parties entered into and still have a binding contract. The trial 
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Gurneys should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT DID NOT FAIL DUE TO LACK OF 
CONSIDERATION BECAUSE, BEFORE ANY PAYMENT 
WAS DUE UNDER ADDENDUM NO. 1, ADDENDUM NO. 
Ill EXTENDED THE SETTLEMENT DEADLINE TO 
FEBRUARY 1,2005 
The Gurneys focus the argument in their Brief of Appellees on the erroneous 
conclusion that the REPC failed due to lack of consideration based upon a "missing" 
$10,000.00 closing-extension payment. By so arguing, it is the Gurneys, and not the 
Young Entities, who seek to divert attention from the actual terms within the four 
corners of the parties' contract. Following Addendum No. 1, the parties entered into 
two additional Addenda (Addendum No. Ill and Addendum No. 3), both of which 
superseded the closing-extension payment requirement of Addendum No. 1. 
The parties executed the REPC and Addendum No. 1 jointly on December 1, 
2003 at 8:30 p.m. (R. 193-206). In reliance upon that execution, the Young Entities 
tendered the $10,000.00 earnest money to the Gurneys. (R. 193-206 and 225 U17). 
The Gurneys accepted and never returned this $10,000.00: they still have it today. 
(R. 225 H18). The parties then proceeded to partially perform the contract for more 
than two years. 
The Settlement Deadline (often referred to as the "closing") in the REPC was 
August 1, 2004. (R. 202 fl 23(f)) Addendum No. 1 modified the August 1, 2004 
closing date - actually accelerating it in the event of final plat approval from the Lehi 
City Council - and allowed for a two-month extension of the August 1,2004 closing 
date upon the Young Entities payment of $10,000 to the title company: 
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In the event the Buyer has not received final plat approval 
with 2.5 units/acre from Lehi by the closing date then the 
Buyer shall be granted one (1) extension to be paid as 
follows: 
a) Buyer to pay an additional ten thousand 
($10,000.00) dollars non-refundable deposit to 
Integrated Title Service no later than July 30, 2004 to 
extend the closing date to October 1, 2004. Deposit 
shall be applied to purchase price at initial closing . . . . 
(R. 199-200) (emphasis added). 
The source of the suggestion that the Young Entities were under an obligation 
to pay a $10,000.00 extension payment comes from the emphasized language. 
According to Addendum No. 1, "to extend the closing date to October 1, 2004" the 
Young Entities needed to make a $10,000.00 payment before July 30,2004. Prior 
to July 30, 2004, however, the parties entered into the second addendum to the 
REPC -Addendum No. Ill -which superseded Addendum No. 1 's closing extension 
terms. 
Addendum No. Ill simply provides: "Buyer and Seller each agree to extend 
said closing an additional 6 months from the Initial closing, not to exceed Feb. 1st 
2005." (R. 191). Addendum No. Ill does not premise the extension of the closing 
date upon any payment, and it extends Settlement Deadline, a/k/a the closing date, 
for the REPC beyond the extension that was available under Addendum No. 1. In 
other words, before any payment was due under Addendum No. 1, Addendum No. 
Ill extended the Settlement Deadline to February 1,2005. Accordingly, Addendum 
No. Ill's extension of the closing date through February 1, 2005 without requiring 
payment, conflicts with and supercedes Addendum No. 1's requirement that the 
Young Entities pay $10,000.00 "to extend the closing date through October 1,2004." 
The Gurneys argue that since Addendum No. Ill is silent as to any payment 
related to the closing extension through February 1, 2005, Addendum No. 1's 
payment requirement survived and applied. This position in untenable because the 
$10,000.00 payment requirement does not universally apply to any extension. 
Rather, it is inextricably linked with Addendum No. 1's optional extension of the 
closing through October 1, 2005. This is evident from Addendum No. 1's plain 
language: "Buyer to pay an additional ten thousand $10,000.00 dollars . . . no later 
than July 30.2004 to extend the closing date to October 1,2004." (R. 198-99). The 
payment requirement cannot be parsed out of the entire provision and given 
meaning on its own. 
The Gurneys cite the recent Utah Supreme Court case of Tangren Family 
Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20,182 P.3d 326,2 but misapply the holding in Tangren 
to the instant case. The holding of Tangren is that "in the face of a clear integration 
clause, extrinsic evidence of a separate oral agreement is not admissible on the 
question of integration." Id. at fl 17. Accordingly, the Court in Tangren overruled its 
early holding in Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 671 P.2d 182 (Utah 1983), 
which allowed parol or extrinsic evidence to determine whether a second agreement 
with a clear integration clause superseded a prior written agreement. See Tangren, 
2008 UT 20 at ^ 16 n.20. An examination of Tangren and Ringwood is entirely 
unnecessary and inappropriate in this case because the Addendum No. Ill, and 
2
 Brief of Appellees at 12. 
Addendum No. 3, clearly specify that "To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM 
modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
. . . , not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same " (R. 191). This is 
not a case in which it is necessary to consider whether an agreement that is silent 
as to its impact upon the REPC may be found to modify the REPC through the 
consideration of parol evidence. 
In any event, the Court in Tangren, however, would have reached exactly the 
same conclusion as the Court did in Ringwood (without of course considering 
extrinsic evidence): the second agreement superseded the first. See Tangren, 2008 
UT 20 at U 16 n.20 ("We therefore would have concluded, as did the trial court [in 
Ringwood], that the second agreement superseded the first.") 
An examination of the facts in the Ringwood case reveals why the conclusion 
that second agreement superseded the first is correct. In Ringwood, the defendants 
agreed to purchase stock for $100,000 and gave the Ringwoods a promissory note 
in that amount in October of 1978. In November of 1978, the parties entered into a 
more comprehensive agreement for the purchase and sale of the stock with terms 
similar to those in the promissory note and with an integration clause. The trial court 
found that the November 1978 agreement superseded the October 1978 promissory 
note. The Utah Supreme Court in the Ringwood case affirmed, concluding that "[t]he 
November agreement contains many of the same or similar provisions found in the 
promissory note.. . . " Ringwood, 671 P.2d at 183. 
In the instant case, Addendum No. Ill superseded Addendum No. 1. Both 
Addenda cover exactly the same term: the REPC's Settlement Deadline. Addendum 
No. 1 extended the Settlement Deadline to October 1, 2004 upon the payment of 
$10,000, but before that payment became due and that extension became effective, 
the parties signed Addendum No. III. Addendum No. Ill was signed on time by 
everyone before the payment was due under Addendum No. 1 to extend the 
Settlement Deadline. Addendum No. Ill extended the Settlement Deadline to 
February 1,2005, without requiring any payment in any amount. Addendum No. 1 's 
Settlement Deadline extension provisions never became effective. 
The other distinct difference between Tangren, Ringwood and the instant 
case, is that in the instant case the integration clause is in the REPC - the first 
signed contract - not in the subsequent addenda. In determining whether the terms 
of Addendum No. 1 conflict with Addendum No. Ill, the integration clause in the 
REPC is not relevant. As previously mentioned, the very language of Addendum No. 
Ill itself resolves this dispute: "To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify 
or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda . . ., these 
terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda.... not 
modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same " (R. 191.) The issue simply 
is whether a conflict between the terms of the Addenda exists, and an integration 
clause in the pre-existing REPC does nothing to further that analysis. If a conflict 
exists, the terms of Addendum No. Ill control. At a minimum, the Settlement 
Deadlines in the Addenda conflict. To obtain the extended Settlement Deadline of 
October 1, 2004, under Addendum No. 1 requires a payment of $10,000; to obtain 
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the extended Settlement Deadline of February 1, 2005, under Addendum No. Ill 
requires no payment. A closer examination of Addendum No. 1 reveals additional 
conflicts not relevant to this case. 
Even if the Court were to regard as tenable the Gurneys' position that 
Addendum No. Ill's silence as to an extension payment preserved Addendum No. 
1 's extension-payment requirement, such a position is no more tenable than the 
Young Entities' position that Addendum No. Ill's silence as to an extension payment-
requirement eliminated such a requirement. This is particularly true considering this 
is a review of a summary judgment. See Tretheway v. Miracle Mortgage, Inc., 2000 
UT 12, U 2, 995 P.2d 599 ("In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party.") 
Moreover, when parties espouse opposing tenable interpretations of 
contractual provisions, such provisions are ambiguous. See Plateau Mining Co. v. 
Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry et ai, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) (stating 
to demonstrate ambiguity the contrary positions of the parties must be tenable). 
Accordingly, the Court "may consider the parties' actions and performance as 
evidence of the parties' true intention." Id. Determination of intent by extrinsic 
evidence presents a question of fact - making summary judgment inappropriate. 
See Schmidt v. Downs, 775 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (determination of 
intent by extrinsic evidence is a question of fact). 
The facts show that Addendum No. Ill was entered into following Lehi City's 
refusal to approve the Gurney Estates Subdivision at a density of 2.5 units per acre, 
as anticipated and incorporated into the REPC and Addendum No. 1. (R. 224 fl 19). 
As a result of Lehi City's actions, Randy Young proposed a reduction in the 
purchase price. (R. 224 fl 20). In lieu of agreeing to a reduction in the purchase 
price, the Gurneys agreed to the extension provided in Addendum No. III. (R. 224 
If 21). The Gurneys have not provided any evidence to rebut the fact that the 
intention of the parties was to extend the closing date as a result of Lehi City's 
changed density requirements and in lieu of a reduced purchase price. At the very 
least, a determination of the parties' intent in entering into Addendum No. Ill 
presented a disputed question of fact that the trial court should not have resolved. 
POINT II 
THE REPC and THE THREE ADDENDA MAY NOT BE 
INVALIDATED DUE TO THEIR DATES OF EXECUTION: 
IN ANY EVENT, ALL OF THE PARTIES SIGNED THE 
SECOND ADDENDUM TO THE REPC, ADDENDUM NO. 
Ill, IN A TIMELY MANNER 
The Trial Court erred in concluding that the REPC and Addendum No. 1 
"lapsed" because they were not executed prior to their November 28, 2003 offer 
acceptance deadline. It similarly would be an error to determine that the third 
addendum to the REPC, Addendum No. 3, is negatively affected by the fact that 
some of the Gurneys executed it after its offer acceptance deadline. The offer 
embodied in the REPC and Addendum No. 1 was created and accepted at the exact 
same time - it could not lapse before it was even created. Further, the Young 
Entities either waived the Gurneys' late acceptance of the REPC and Addendum No. 
1, and their partial late acceptance of Addendum No. 3,or they represented 
counteroffers the Young Entities accepted. 
A. The Trial Court Improperly Resolved Disputes of Material Fact 
Regarding Dates of Contract Execution 
As a preliminary matter, it is worth repeating that the trial court improperly 
resolved disputes of material fact regarding the dates of execution of the contract 
documents. Specifically, the trial court found that it was an undisputed fact that 
neither the REPC nor any of the Addenda were "signed timely by any of the parties." 
(R. 551 fl 5). The evidence in the record does not support this finding. At best, the 
trial court improperly resolved disputes of material fact. 
All of the parties timely signed the second addendum to the REPC, Addendum 
No. Ill, with the last party signing on June 8, 2004 - six days before the offer 
acceptance deadline.3 (R. 191). Addendum No. Ill, including its date of creation is 
material, in part because it modified and superseded the closing extension terms of 
Addendum No. 1, including the elimination of Addendum No. 1*s $10,000.00 
extension payment requirement. See Point I, supra. 
The Gurneys direct this Court's attention to a meaningless document. Instead 
of explaining how Addendum No. Ill can possibly be interpreted as having been 
untimely signed, and seeking to avoid the implications of Addendum No. Ill's terms, 
the Gurneys direct the Court's attention to "Addendum No. II." See Brief of 
Appellees at 21. There is no document in the record called "Addendum No. II." 
3
 As noted in the Young Entities' opening Brief, the Gurneys' counsel 
suggested to the trial court that the date next to LaRae Jeppson's signature should 
be read "615/04" instead of "6/5/04". The only evidence in the record concerning the 
dates of execution of Addendum No. Ill is the Addendum itself. Careful examination 
of Addendum No. Ill shows that LaRae executed the Addendum at the same time 
as her husband Lee, "6/5/04 6:15 p.m." (R. 191, 100 and 36). At the very least, 
there is a dispute of material fact concerning the date of LaRae's execution - a 
dispute that should not have been resolved by the trial court. 
The parties did consider a document called "Addendum No. 2", but that 
document was never consummated. (R. 104). Addendum No. 2 is a meaningless 
red herring. All of the parties signed the second addendum to the REPC, Addendum 
No. Ill, before its offer acceptance deadline. The Trial Court's error on this point 
alone is enough to reverse its entry of summary judgment.4 "[0]nly one material fact 
in dispute is required to reverse a summary judgment." Yoho Auto., Inc. v. 
Shillington, 784 P.2d 1253,1255 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted). 
B. The REPC and Addendum No. 1 Were Valid and Binding Despite 
Their Date of Execution 
All of the parties simultaneously executed both the REPC and Addendum No. 
1 on December 1, 2003 at 8:30 p.m. (R. 193-206). Accordingly, those documents' 
offer acceptance deadlines of November 28, 2003 cannot invalidate the contract. 
The offer embodied in the REPC and Addendum No. 1 was not even created until 
after the acceptance deadline, and the offer was immediately accepted upon its 
creation. Under these circumstances, the offer acceptance deadline of November 
28, 2003 is of no consequence. 
Even if the offer acceptance deadline is considered to have significance, the 
"late acceptance" of the offer does not invalidate the contract. In examining the 
validity of the acceptance of offers rendered in violation of specific offer acceptance 
conditions, such as time of acceptance limitations, courts take two approaches. 
4
 The trial court's finding that none of the parties singed any of the contract 
documents in a timely fashion also is in error in another material respect. 
Specifically, both the Young Entities and at least three of the Gurneys executed 
Addendum No. 3 before its offer acceptance deadline. (R. 189). 
Under one approach, the offeror is free to waive the offer acceptance 
conditions because the offer acceptance conditions are contractual provisions 
running to his or her benefit. "It is well-settled a contracting party may waive 
conditions placed in a contract solely for that party's benefit. The provision in an 
offer specifying the means of acceptance is such a condition and may be waived by 
the offeror." Sabo v. Fasano, 201 Cal. Rptr. 270,271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (citations 
omitted); See also Nichols v. Nicholas, 141 A.2d 746,748 (Md. Ct. App. 1958) and 
Beirne v. Alaska State Hous. Auth. 454 P.2d 262, 264-65 (Alaska 1969). The other 
approach is to consider the late acceptance to be a counteroffer that, in turn, the 
original offeror may accept. See Restatement (First) Contracts § 73 (1932). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a party is free to waive 
contractual provisions and conditions precedent running to its benefit: 
[A] party to a contract, who is entitled to demand 
performance of a condition precedent, may waive the 
same, either expressly or by acts evidencing such 
intention; and performance of a condition precedent to 
taking effect of the contract may be waived by the acts of 
the parties in treating the agreement as in effect. 
Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 229 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1951) (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts 
§ 491). The Court also has applied the counteroffer approach. See Frandsen v. 
Gertsner, 487 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1971) (holding late or defective acceptance is 
counteroffer which the original offeror must in turn accept in order to create 
contract). 
"Regardless of the legal analytical vehicle, i.e., a counter offer and acceptance 
or an express retroactive waiver of the time limitation for the acceptance, the end 
result is the same." Cain v. Noel, 235 S.E.2d 292, 293 (S.C. 1977). The Young 
Entities waived any right flowing from the offer acceptance deadline clauses in the 
REPC and Addendum No. 1. (R. 226 H 13). Their tender of the earnest money 
signaled their waiver, a waiver reaffirmed by entering into two additional Addenda, 
by performing the contract for more than two years, and ultimately by suing for 
specific enforcement of the contract. 
If the Gurneys' acceptance of the REPC and Addendum No. 1 is considered 
a counter-offer, then the end result is the same: the Young Entities accepted the 
counteroffer and a binding contract was formed. The Young Entities' execution of 
the contract documents at the exact same time as the Gurneys, the Young Entities' 
tender of earnest money, their execution of two additional Addenda, and their 
lengthy performance of the contract evidence the Young Entities' acceptance of the 
counteroffer.5 
5
 The counteroffer approach to validating late acceptance of an offer has been 
questioned as possibly implicating the statute of frauds. See Sabo v. Fasano, 201 
Cal. Rptr. 270,271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (questioning whether the buyer's signature 
on the original offer would satisfy the statue of frauds). 
In Utah, a third signature by the Young Entities is not required to satisfy the 
statute of frauds. "One or more writings, not all of which are signed by the party to 
be charged, may be considered together as a memorandum for purposes of the 
statute of frauds if there is a nexus between them." Machan Hampshire Prop., Inc. 
v. Western Real Estate & Dev. Co.,779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The 
REPC and the three Addenda, all of which are signed by all of the parties together 
"contain all the essential terms and provisions of the contract to which the parties 
have agreed." Id. 
C. Addendum No. 3 is Valid and Binding Despite its Dates of 
Execution 
Applying either the waiver or counteroffer theories, the late-acceptance of 
Addendum No. 3 by some of the Gurneys also does not invalidate the contract. The 
Young entities waived any right flowing from the offer acceptance deadline in 
Addendum No. 3. (R. 222 fl 33). Alternatively, they accepted the counteroffer 
created through the Gurneys' late acceptance of Addendum No. 3. The Young 
Entities' continued performance of the contract and the significant time and 
resources they expended to bring the contract to closing evidences their acceptance 
of the counteroffer. (R. 222 If 34). 
D. The Time Is of the Essence Clause Does Not Operate to Invalidate 
the REPC, Addendum No. 1 or Addendum No. 3 
Both the trial court and the Gurneys place particular emphasis on the REPC's 
"time is of the essence" clause in finding that the REPC and Addendum No. 1 
"lapsed" due to their date of execution. "Time is of the essence" means that 
"performance by one party at time or within period specified in contract is essential 
to enable him to require performance of the other party." Black's Law Dictionary 
1483 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, "time is of the essence" is a concept of contract 
performance, not contract formation. After all, the REPC's "time is of the essence" 
clause has no effect if the contract or even the offer, as the Gurneys suggest in this 
case, never existed in the first place. The trial court's reliance upon the "time is of 
the essence" clause to invalidate the REPC and Addendum No. 1 based upon their 
offer acceptance deadlines was misplaced. Whether an offer containing a condition 
precedent, such as time of acceptance, has been validly accepted should be 
determined through the application of the waiver or counteroffer analyses examined 
above. 
Moreover, the trial court erred in concluding that "Time of performance was 
an essential element of the documents and could not be waived." (R. 551). A "time 
is of the essence" provision may be waived: "Even where time is of the essence, a 
breach of the contract in that respect by one of the parties may be waived by the 
other party subsequently treating the contract as still in force, through words or 
Conduct indicating that the provision is no longer of importance, or by conduct that 
contributes to the delay." 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 609; see also Provo City 
Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803,806 (Utah 1979) ("It is true that parties to 
a written contract may modify, waive, or make new contractual terms, even if the 
contract itself contains a provision to the contrary.") As previously discussed, the 
parties in this case clearly waived an rights arising from the "time is of the essence" 
clause by treating the contract as binding. 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINES OF RATIFICATION, WAIVER and 
ESTOPPEL PREVENT THE INVALIDATION OF THE 
PARTIES' CONTRACT DUE TO THE DATES OF 
EXECUTION or THE LACK OF AN EXTENSION 
PAYMENT 
Even if the Gurneys, at some point, did have the right to escape from the 
parties' contract, it was and is inequitable to allow them to exercise such right given 
the facts of this case. "Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which precludes parties 
from asserting their rights where their actions render it inequitable to allow them to 
assert those rights." Brixen & Christopher Architects v. Elton, 111 P.2d 1039,1043 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). This case presents the Court with "very compelling 
circumstances where the interests of justice, morality, and common fairness clearly 
dictate that [the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied]." Phillips v. 
Borough ofKeyport, 107 F.3d 164, 182 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
The Gurneys present no substantive argument in support of the notion that the 
parties' contract was void ab initio (or "lapsed"), virtually conceding that the trial court 
erred on that point. It is very obviously inequitable to declare the REPC void ab initio 
due to its date of execution when the Gurneys signed the document then accepted 
and never returned the earnest money. After all, the provision of the REPC 
declaring the earnest money non-refundable has no force or effect when the contract 
never existed in the first place. The inequity inherent in declaring the REPC void ab 
initio becomes even more apparent when one considers that the Gurneys partially 
performed the contract for more than two years, executed two additional addenda, 
and never complained about the REPC's date of execution, allowing without 
complaint and even positively assisting the Young Entities to expend considerable 
time and resources in reliance upon the contract. 
The Young Entities had no obligation under the clear terms of Addenda Nos. 
Ill and 3 to make any extension payment. See Point I, supra. Even if they did have 
such an obligation, the facts again demand the application of estoppel. The parties 
continued to perform the contract for more than 18 months after alleged Addendum 
No. 1 July 30, 2004 extension payment due date. Every action by the Gurneys 
following that alleged deadline and up to the date their lawyers filed this lawsuit 
indicated that the parties continued to have a binding contract: The Gurneys entered 
into a third Addendum, they worked in concert with the Young Entities to secure 
development approvals from Lehi City including an annexation agreement and 
preliminary plat approval and they entered into the collateral Water Transfer 
Agreement. At the same time the Gurneys' inaction also indicated that the contract 
continued to be binding - they never once complained about the missing extension 
payment or suggested it negatively affected the contract.6 
In reliance upon the Gurneys' actions and conspicuous inaction, the Young 
Entities continued, at great expense, to perform the contract. The Gurneys suggest 
that estoppel is inapplicable because the development approvals secured through 
the partial performance of the parties' contract are solely for the benefit of the Young 
Entities. Even if that is true,7 the loss of benefits to the Young Entities is the 
operable element of estoppel: 
Estoppel requires proof of three elements: (1) a statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent 
with a later-asserted claim; (2) the other party's 
reasonable action or inaction based upon the first party's 
6
 The Gurneys seek to escape the ramifications of their silence by suggesting 
that "The Gurneys did not discover until May 2006 that the second earnest money 
amount had not been deposited." Opposition Brief at 18. Such a statement is not 
supported by the record. Paul Gurney testified that he did not discover the "missing" 
extension payment until May 2006. (R. 366). His testimony says nothing about the 
other Gurneys' knowledge. If indeed such an extension payment was due, as the 
Gurneys contend, they all knew of the requirement and cannot plead ignorance. 
"Each party has the burden to understand the terms of a contract before he affixes 
his signature to it and may not thereafter assert his ignorance as a defense." 
Western Properties v. Southern Utah Aviation Co., 776 P.2d 656,658 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (citations omitted). 
7
 If this trial court's decision is reversed, it will be interesting to listen to the 
Gurneys explain why, within days of the trial court's decision, they were knocking on 
the door of the Lehi City Engineer's office requesting copies of the Young Entities' 
engineering plans for the Gurney Estates Subdivision. 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury 
to the second party that would result from allowing 
the first party to contradict or repudiate its statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. 
Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046,1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). 
The trial court's invalidation of the REPC resulted in the Young Entities' 
complete loss of their $10,000.00 earnest money payment and the extensive time 
and resources they expended in partial performance of the contract (not to mention 
the obligation to pay the Gurneys' attorney fees). "[T]he interests of justice, morality, 
and common fairness clearly dictate that" the Gurneys should be estopped from 
asserting their late-breaking, lawyer generated, complaints about the REPC's 
invalidity. Phillips v. Borough ofKeyport, 107 F.3d 164,182 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
POINT IV 
THE CONTRACT REMAINS UNDER EXTENSION 
A. The Gurneys Breached Their Obligations Under Addendum No. 3 
In their Opposition Brief the Gurneys made no response to the fact that they 
breached the terms Addendum No. 3 to the REPC. Instead, they disingenuously 
suggest that the Young Entities fail to point out which specific provisions of the 
REPC and Addenda the Gurneys breached. Point IV(C), starting on page 42, of the 
Young Entities' Brief very specifically notes that the Gurneys breached Paragraph 
2 of Addendum No. 3 to the REPC. Addendum No. 3 provides: 
1. Due to delays with water share agreement issues 
Buyer & Seller agree to extend the closing date to June 
15,2005. 
2. Both parties will give full cooperation while working 
with the City & State entities through the entitlement 
process & water share assignments. 
3. Since the Buyer has no control over the water issues 
between [Gurney] family members it is difficult, if not 
impossible to move the land forward until these issues are 
resolved, it is agreed, should such water resolution issues 
continue to delay progress through the City, for each day 
of delay, it will set the closing back for a day. 
(R. 189) (emphasis added). 
The Gurneys breached Paragraph 2 of the Addendum No. 3 by failing and 
refusing to "give full cooperation" in working with City and State entities in regard to 
securing development entitlements and completing water share assignments. 
Specifically, the Gurneys failed and refused to transfer certain well water rights to the 
Lehi Metropolitan Water District. (R. 239fl 6). The Gurneys' failure to comply with 
that obligation and other "water share assignment" obligations set forth in the parties' 
Water Transfer Agreement is direct evidence of the Gurneys' breach of their 
obligation to "give full cooperation while working with the City & State entities through 
the entitlement process & water share assignments." (R. 189). 
The Water Transfer Agreement and the Gurneys' failures to meet that 
Agreement's obligations are admissible evidence establishing the Gurneys' breach 
of Addendum No. 3 for several reasons. First, the Water Transfer Agreement is not 
parol evidence - it is not "contemporaneous conversations, statements, or 
representations offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of 
[Addendum No. 3]." Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). 
Rather, the Gurneys' failure to comply with their water share assignment obligations 
is direct evidence of their failure to meet Addendum No. 3's clear and unaltered 
requirement that they "give full cooperation" in relation to "water share assignments." 
Second, the requirements of Paragraph 2 of Addendum No. 3 are ambiguous 
as to exactly what the parties intended by "give full cooperation" and as to exactly 
what was meant by "water share assignments." Even if the Water Transfer 
Agreement is parol evidence in relation to Addendum No. 3, it may be considered 
to clarify these ambiguities in Addendum No. 3. See Tangren Family Trust v. 
Tangren, 2008 UT 20, fl 11,182 P.3d 326 ("parol evidence may be admitted only if 
the court makes a subsequent determination that the language of the agreement is 
ambiguous"). The Water Transfer Agreement specifies exactly what each parties' 
obligations were in relation to "water share assignments." 
Third, Paragraph 14 of the REPC provides, "This contract cannot be changed 
except by written agreement of the parties." (R. 203). The Water Transfer 
Agreement is a written agreement executed by all of the parties to the REPC. (R. 
234-36). It specifically provides the mechanism by which the water share 
assignments contemplated by the REPC, and necessary for the entitlement 
approvals contemplated by the REPC, would be accomplished.8 Thus, the Water 
Transfer Agreement alternatively may be seen as a written and signed modification 
of the REPC's water assignment provisions. 
8
 The REPC included in the sale 53.82 shares of water or shares equal to the 
required amount by Lehi City for Development. (R. 206). Lehi City required 
compliance with the water share assignment obligations set forth in the Water 
Transfer Agreement prior to giving final plat approval to the Gurney Estates 
Subdivision. (R. 229-41). 
Finally, the Water Transfer Agreement also may be seen as a binding accord 
and satisfaction regarding the REPC's water assignment provisions. 
An accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a 
contract agree that a different performance, to be made in 
substitution of the performance originally agreed upon, will 
discharge the obligation created under the original 
agreement. 
Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) (citations 
omitted). Because the Water Transfer Agreement specifies the exact manner and 
assigns the exact obligations, through which Lehi City's water requirements would 
be met, the Agreement alternatively may be viewed as an accord and satisfaction 
as to performance of the REPC's water transfer provisions. 
B. Addendum No. 3 Extends the REPC 
Addendum No. 3 provides, "[l]t is agreed, should such water resolution issues 
continue to delay progress through the City, for each day of delay, it will set the 
closing back for a day." (R. 189). The Gurneys' delayed progress through the City, 
perpetuating "water resolution issues" through their failure to "give full cooperation" 
relating to the "water share assignments." Accordingly, the REPC was and is 
extended on a day by day basis due to the Gurneys' failures. 
Because the day-by-day extension of the REPC contains no specified 
expiration, the extension lasts for a reasonable period of time. See Cooper v. 
Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 757 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("When 
a contract fails to specify the time by which a certain act must be performed, the law 
implies the act be performed within a reasonable time.") The Gurneys themselves 
recognized and admitted, through their attorney, that the REPC remained valid and 
OH 
binding as late as January 5, 2006. (R. 215-16). Moreover, the Gurneys did not 
object to the Young Entities' claims for specific enforcement of the REPC and Water 
Transfer Agreement on the ground that the reasonable period of time for the 
Gurneys to meet their own water assignment obligations per Addendum No. 3 had 
expired. 
POINT V 
THE AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY and OTHER EVIDENCE 
SUBMITTED BY THE YOUNG ENTITIES IS 
ADMISSIBLE 
The Gurneys devote a significant portion of their Opposition Brief to arguing 
that the Young Entities are improperly relying upon parol evidence, specifically 
affidavit testimony, to modify the provisions of the REPC and Addenda. For all of 
their argument, however, the Gurneys fail to cite the Court to even one specific piece 
of "parol evidence" relied upon by the Young Entities to supposedly modify the 
provisions of the REPC and Addenda. The Gurneys silence is telling - there is no 
inadmissible parol evidence in the record. 
Parol evidence consists of "contemporaneous conversations, statements, or 
representations offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract." Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663,665 (Utah 1985). None 
of the Affidavit testimony submitted by the Young Entities is submitted for the 
purposes of varying the provisions of the REPC and Addenda. The Affidavits provide 
the only verified full and complete copies of the REPC, the Addenda, the Water 
Transfer Agreement and other important documents. They also provide details 
concerning the circumstances under which the parties executed the contract 
documents, the purposes for which certain contract documents were executed and 
the parties' actions in executing and performing (or not performing) their obligations 
per the terms of the REPC and Addenda. Such testimony is not parol evidence. 
Finally, to the extent the Court considers certain provisions of the REPC and 
Addenda to be ambiguous, such as Addendum No. 3's requirements, the Affidavit 
testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding and purposes of the contract 
documents, as well as the evidence of their actions taken in regard to performance 
of the contract, may clarify such provisions and is admissible for that purpose. 
"[Pjarol evidence is admissible to clarify facial ambiguity." Id. at 665 n.1. 
Even if none of the REPC and Addenda provisions are considered to be 
ambiguous, the plain language of the REPC and Addenda establish that they cannot 
be invalidated for the reasons specified by the trial court, or for any other reasons. 
CONCLUSION 
The parties simultaneously executed both the REPC and Addendum No. 1. 
The Settlement Deadline in the REPC was August 1, 2004. Addendum No. 1 
modified the August 1, 2004 closing date - actually accelerating it under certain 
circumstances - and allowed for a two-month extension of the August 1, 2004 
closing date upon the Young Entities payment of $10,000 to the title company. 
Before that $10,000 payment was necessary, the parties timely negotiated and 
executed Addendum No. Ill, extending the Settlement Deadline to February 1,2005, 
this time without the necessity of any further payment. 
Before the February 1,2005 Settlement Deadline, the parties negotiated and 
then executed Addendum No. 3, in which they once again agreed to delay the 
closing: "it is agreed, should such water resolution issues continue to delay progress 
through the City, for each day of delay, it will set the closing back for a day." The 
Gurneys, however, never performed their obligations to deliver the requisite water 
under the terms of paragraph 1.3 of the REPC, delaying the resolution of the water 
issues and preventing the closing. Now the Gurneys admit they failed to perform, 
but imply that the Young Entities should have performed the Gurneys' obligations 
under the REPC for them. Brief of Appellees at 9. 
The Gurney now attempt to excuse their lack of performance, claiming that 
they did not execute either the REPC or any of its Addenda in a timely manner. The 
"time is of the essence" clause applies to a party's performance - such as the 
Gurneys' requirement to provide water under paragraph 1.3 of the REPC - not to the 
execution of the contract. The Gurneys' failure to sign the REPC on time is 
something the Young Entities waived, or if not waived, a counteroffer the Young 
entities accepted. It should not provide the Gurneys either a legal or equitable 
means of escaping from an otherwise valid REPC. 
The trial court's granting of summary judgment should be reversed, and this 
case should be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Court's ruling. 
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